



# Trust fabric for wallets

Trust & Identity Incubator Final Demo

Demo, Online

02 Mai 2024

Public (PU)

## Why?

- Europe is working towards a wallet-based identity ecosystem.
- Two protocols are in the core of the specification: ISO 18013-5:2021 (mDL) and OpenID4VC + Verifiable Credentials.
- The current version of the ARF has not yet decided on the trust fabric. However, for a real world ecosystem, it is clear an interoperable trust fabric will be needed.
- The OpenID Federation specification seems to have many characteristics that would allow such a wallet ecosystem to be defined.



This activity will investigate and test the use of the OpenID Federation protocol as a trust fabric for a wallet ecosystem


## Wallet instance attestation

-> How to know the Wallet asking for credentials is fit for purpose?


- The wallet provider validates the wallet(software) and possibly OS is correct
- But we do not want to depend on big tech to do it for us each and every time
- We may have additional rules, depending on Wallet capabilities
- We do not want to create wallet 'islands'

Which components of OpenID Federation are used to express what?


## Wallet Attestation Scenario - EUDI only



# Wallet Attestation Scenario - EUDI only



# Wallet Attestation Scenario - EUDI and other wallets



## Existing trust framework

- eduGAIN policy
- REFEDs specifications evaluation: <https://edu.nl/wye4g>

## REFEDs specification

The information from the specifications is distributed in two ways:

- Entity metadata 🥵
- As part of the transaction 😁

## Personalized Access v.2

( And "Research and Scholarship", "Anonymous Access" & "Pseudonymous Access" )

The following was noted:

- The layout needs significant changes
- Use of SAML specific jargon, including "Entity Category"
- Contact details in OIDC specification only allow for a simple multivalued list of strings.  
-> proposal in github suggests a new claim, "contacts\_detailed", supporting the same granularity as is used in the SAML implementation of the specification.
- It is not possible to have the same Trustmark exist both as a self-issued and at the same time as issued by a trustmark issuer
- Well developed mechanism to delegate the issuance and ownership of Trustmarks.
- Introduce a personalized scope to streamline the exchange of personal data

An example of what an adopted version of the specification might look like:

<https://github.com/surfnet-niels/REFEDs-specifications/blob/main/personalized.md>

(Please note: the above is NOT a proposal to actually change the specification!)



# RAF, MFA, SFA and SIRTFI

## Assurance Framework


- The assurance profile already has a provision (section 7) on how to use the specification with OIDC.
- All statements which are part of this specification are expressed as claim values.


## MFA and SFA framework

- The Multi- and Single Factor Authentication profile express all statements at transaction time.
- Both specifications already describe how to use these both in the SAML and in OIDC.
- In a wallet ecosystem, it might be relevant to transport this MFA or SFA information as part of a verifiable credentials statement, perhaps by extending RAF

## SIRTFI

- The SIRTFI specification leverages metadata to signal compliance for both SPs/RP as well as IdP/OP.
- All of the challenges identified with 'Personalized Access' apply
- The OIDC specification supports the concept of contact details, but only as a simple multivalued list of strings. The SIRTFI specification mandates the presence of a security contact, as described in the Security Contact specification. To resolve this issue, a new claim, "contacts\_detailed", could support the required granularity that is needed.







**Thank You**

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