FoD v1.5 = FoD with new functionalities: rule range specification, current rule behaviour statistic graphs, multi-tenant rule control REST-API
FoD v1.6 = FoD with automated rule proposal from RepShield
Other FoD v1.5 pilot preparations
Existing user documentation (as presentation document) update currently in progress
Pilot evaluation survey which was of used for FoD v1.1 has to be reviewed and updated for v1.5
Pilot UAT testing
Fix by Tomas for specifying port 0 has been provided, still has to be tested on testing machine before creating new rpm for UAT machine
Second UAT VC: feedback from pilot users:
LITNET tried again rule 53,0 to mitigate a short 5-20 min DDoS attack -> failed somehow and no graphs were created
EENET: strange DDoS attack at end of year (repeated at particular intervals), mitigation (rate-limiting) worked with a single rule, but graphs with longer time range would be desirable to easier investigate attack behaviour
EENET started to test REST API, e.g. nice would be possibility to reactivate a rule every week after auto-timeout
idea (LITNET): for single attacker IP address+port allow to block traffic to whole subnet (also bigger than /29) to mitigate e.g. scanning attacks
CERT meeting in Hamburg, 5-7.02.2018
FoD v1.5 production service documents
Now for the future production phase of FoD v1.5 (and all further versions) all necessary PLM documents have to be prepared, e.g. CBA, service description, service design plan
Especially for the operative documents this will be done in close cooperation of Evangelos
Silvia/Nino will provisionally provide a summary document about the planning of the testing/result reporting in 1 week
GARR Arbor PoC: preliminary results:
ARBOR's so-called profile detection seems to be incapable of detecting DDoS attacks (even to some reliable extent) out of highly dynamic and unforeseeable research network traffic in GARR
So profile detection is disabled for now in the PoC
Beyond that ARBOR is creating a large number of false positives
Furthermore, alert export of ARBOR is quite limited, so far only email export seems to be realizable
But because of the high false positive rate is not considered currently
Remaining use of ARBOR in GARR (and so also similar research networks, including universities) may be to limit the DDoS detection to particular machines, e.g. DNS servers
RepShield/NERD
RepShield/NERD development: some performance improvements
Silvia/Nino will check how to share alert data from their FastNetMon PoC to Warden, Václav will support them in writing/installing Warden filer script for exporting